Covering and Culture
Research indicates that the decision to cover is dictated by cultural factors rather than theology. A definitive ethnographic study of young Muslim Americans conducted by Rhys H. Williams and Gira Vashi presents a few observations that are fundamental to understanding the interaction of Islam, hijab, and American culture.
First is the assumption that hijab represents the unequal status of women in the Muslim world. The authors call on social and political theory to argue that American society places very high value on equality and equal rights, which include the idea that all people are free from control by institutions besides that specified in the social contract of government and that all people within a society are treated equally. Because this has led to some homogenization between genders such as relaxation of double moral standards and the adoption of more masculine clothing by women, the authors contend that these beliefs lead many Americans to perceive difference, like covering, as inequality (275). Combined with salient and sometimes sensationalist media stories about the restriction of women’s rights in Muslim countries such as driving laws in Saudi Arabia, Americans come to see the hijab as indicative of gender inequality inherent in Islam.
The second cultural factor that Williams and Vashi identify is the non-denominational, nationwide critique of American “individualism, materialism and lax sexual mores” which the authors claim is common among Muslims (266). Raised in religious institutions where this critical discussion is common, the authors claim, young American Muslims grow up with two competing narratives - American values of equal rights and Muslim values of modesty, collectivity, and the threat of an immoral American culture - which compete for cultural and identity space (267). With these clashing contexts in mind, Williams and Vashi conducted ethnographic interviews and focus groups which parallel the research we plan to do. They held in-depth single interviews and larger focus groups with a sample of mostly college age Muslim women. While Muslim men and non-college students were included, the study largely focused on the same demographic we seek to interview. One important bias to note is that interviews were conducted through Muslim community institutions, and all respondents were therefore at least somewhat religious (273). These interviews revealed a strong sense of agency among young Muslim women, many of whom began covering in college regardless of whether the women in their family cover. Some even cover against their parents’ wishes. Respondents described hijab as a facet of identity and a cultural signifier both within the Muslim community and outside it. With this, Williams and Vashi conclude that among young Muslim women, hijab is foremost a cultural tool to “negotiate their dual identities as Muslims and Americans” (272). Through our study, we seek to understand if these sentiments are the same in the Houston community or vastly different.
Empirical data from a 2017 Pew Research study seem to support Williams and Vashi’s findings. In 2017, approximately 4 in 10 Muslim women report that they always wear hijab in public. While this number has not changed since 2007, the number of Muslims who mark religion as “very important” in their lives has decreased from 72% to 65% since 2007 (7). While covering and religiosity have been highly correlated in past surveys, this divergence in correlation might indicate that the proportion of women who cover has remained constant in spite of waning religiosity as more young people choose to cover for cultural reasons. This is merely speculative, however, as causation cannot be established but we can test if this holds true in our sample.
With 58% of adult Muslims in the United States being born abroad, it is also important to note the influence that cultural practice in Muslim countries has on covering (Pew 1). A study from the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research surveyed 7 major Muslim countries, asking the most appropriate form of dress for a woman to wear in public. While traditional hijab covering the hair and ears was the most commonly preferred style of dress across all seven countries, there were a few countries where other preferences were indicated. 32% of respondents in Turkey and 49% in Lebanon chose no covering at all as the most appropriate style (55). Considering that his survey did not select for age, gender, or religiosity, these growing numbers indicate that covering is becoming increasingly uncommon among the younger generation in Turkey and Lebanon. The survey also asked whether women should be able to choose how to dress. Unsurprisingly, around 50% said “yes” in Turkey and Lebanon. One surprising finding, however is that 47% of respondents in Saudi Arabia, a country which strongly prefers more conservative covering, also said “yes” (59). When we ask respondents about their countries of origin we may be able to shed light on how women from different countries understand their choice to cover.
Research by Alec Tobin
First is the assumption that hijab represents the unequal status of women in the Muslim world. The authors call on social and political theory to argue that American society places very high value on equality and equal rights, which include the idea that all people are free from control by institutions besides that specified in the social contract of government and that all people within a society are treated equally. Because this has led to some homogenization between genders such as relaxation of double moral standards and the adoption of more masculine clothing by women, the authors contend that these beliefs lead many Americans to perceive difference, like covering, as inequality (275). Combined with salient and sometimes sensationalist media stories about the restriction of women’s rights in Muslim countries such as driving laws in Saudi Arabia, Americans come to see the hijab as indicative of gender inequality inherent in Islam.
The second cultural factor that Williams and Vashi identify is the non-denominational, nationwide critique of American “individualism, materialism and lax sexual mores” which the authors claim is common among Muslims (266). Raised in religious institutions where this critical discussion is common, the authors claim, young American Muslims grow up with two competing narratives - American values of equal rights and Muslim values of modesty, collectivity, and the threat of an immoral American culture - which compete for cultural and identity space (267). With these clashing contexts in mind, Williams and Vashi conducted ethnographic interviews and focus groups which parallel the research we plan to do. They held in-depth single interviews and larger focus groups with a sample of mostly college age Muslim women. While Muslim men and non-college students were included, the study largely focused on the same demographic we seek to interview. One important bias to note is that interviews were conducted through Muslim community institutions, and all respondents were therefore at least somewhat religious (273). These interviews revealed a strong sense of agency among young Muslim women, many of whom began covering in college regardless of whether the women in their family cover. Some even cover against their parents’ wishes. Respondents described hijab as a facet of identity and a cultural signifier both within the Muslim community and outside it. With this, Williams and Vashi conclude that among young Muslim women, hijab is foremost a cultural tool to “negotiate their dual identities as Muslims and Americans” (272). Through our study, we seek to understand if these sentiments are the same in the Houston community or vastly different.
Empirical data from a 2017 Pew Research study seem to support Williams and Vashi’s findings. In 2017, approximately 4 in 10 Muslim women report that they always wear hijab in public. While this number has not changed since 2007, the number of Muslims who mark religion as “very important” in their lives has decreased from 72% to 65% since 2007 (7). While covering and religiosity have been highly correlated in past surveys, this divergence in correlation might indicate that the proportion of women who cover has remained constant in spite of waning religiosity as more young people choose to cover for cultural reasons. This is merely speculative, however, as causation cannot be established but we can test if this holds true in our sample.
With 58% of adult Muslims in the United States being born abroad, it is also important to note the influence that cultural practice in Muslim countries has on covering (Pew 1). A study from the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research surveyed 7 major Muslim countries, asking the most appropriate form of dress for a woman to wear in public. While traditional hijab covering the hair and ears was the most commonly preferred style of dress across all seven countries, there were a few countries where other preferences were indicated. 32% of respondents in Turkey and 49% in Lebanon chose no covering at all as the most appropriate style (55). Considering that his survey did not select for age, gender, or religiosity, these growing numbers indicate that covering is becoming increasingly uncommon among the younger generation in Turkey and Lebanon. The survey also asked whether women should be able to choose how to dress. Unsurprisingly, around 50% said “yes” in Turkey and Lebanon. One surprising finding, however is that 47% of respondents in Saudi Arabia, a country which strongly prefers more conservative covering, also said “yes” (59). When we ask respondents about their countries of origin we may be able to shed light on how women from different countries understand their choice to cover.
Research by Alec Tobin
Moaddel, Mansoor, et al. “The Birthplace of the Arab Spring: Values and Perceptions of Tunisians and A Comparative Assessment of Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Pakistani, Saudi, Tunisian, and Turkish Publics.” Middle Eastern Values Study, 15 December 2015, https://mevs.org/files/tmp/Tunisia_FinalReport.pdf.
Pew Research Center. “U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to Believe in the American Dream.” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project, 26 July 2017, http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-centers-2017-survey-of-us-muslims/.
Williams, Rhys H., and Gira Vashi. “‘Hijab’ and American Muslim Women: Creating the Space for Autonomous Selves.” Sociology of Religion, vol. 68, no. 3, 2007, pp. 269–287. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20453164?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
Pew Research Center. “U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to Believe in the American Dream.” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project, 26 July 2017, http://www.pewforum.org/2017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-centers-2017-survey-of-us-muslims/.
Williams, Rhys H., and Gira Vashi. “‘Hijab’ and American Muslim Women: Creating the Space for Autonomous Selves.” Sociology of Religion, vol. 68, no. 3, 2007, pp. 269–287. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20453164?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.